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1
On September 11, 2001, tragedy struck the United States
after nineteen hijackers slipped past security in three American
airports and, wielding only knives and box cutters, successfully
gained control of four United States commercial airliners. The
terrorists crashed two planes into the World Trade Center,
collapsing the Twin Towers and killing more than 3000 people,
and rammed a third plane into the Pentagon where there were an
additional 189 casualties.2 The ability of hijackers to use our
commercial jets as weapons of mass destruction proves that airport
security is not only a concern for airline passengers, but also a
threat to national security.
Recovery was underway September 27th, when President
Bush proclaimed after reopening the nation's airports that the
United States was once again "open for business." 3 But business
in the United States has been slow since the attacks. Seven weeks
after the attacks, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt said
that "[t]he biggest thing that is interrupting our economy is fear,
1 J.D. Candidate 2003, University of North Carolina School of Law.
2 CNN, Recovery: Fed Expectations Fuel Rally, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/1 1/05/rec.recovery.facts/index.html (Nov. 5,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
3 Jim Bums, Bush Outlines Airline Safety Plan, CNSNews.com, available at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/9/27/160845.shtml (Sept. 27,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
especially fear of getting onto airplanes." 4 Consequently,
commercial airlines have seen sharp declines in ticket sales as
Americans are staying close to home or choosing alternative means
of travel for fear of flying what were once dubbed the "friendly
skies." Although Congress has authorized a $15 billion bailout
package to help the airlines recover, this measure alone is unlikely
to sustain the airlines unless it is accompanied by an increase in
ticket sales.
5
It is imperative to restore consumer confidence in
America's airlines in order to stimulate demand. Thus, the
American people, still reeling from the September 1 lth attack and
fearful of future attacks, need to be reassured that airport security
is being improved to ensure their safety in the air and prevent other
terrorists from using commercial airliners as weapons of mass
destruction.
While increased airport security is necessary to protect
Americans in the air and on the ground, it is vital to consider the
effects of new security measures on the personal freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution. United States history, through the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War 116 and the
Palmer raids during the Cold War,7 proves that it is all too easy to
4 House Vote on FederalizingAirport Screeners Due Today, USA TODAY, Nov.
1, 2001, at 9A.
5 CNN, Bush Signs Airline Bailout Package, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/22/rec.airline.deal/index.html (Sept. 23, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Newsweek Web Exclusive, Questions and Answers: The Legacy of Internment
Camps, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/644274.asp (Oct. 17, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
7 Michael Reese, The Cold War and Red Scare in Washington State, Center for
the Study of the Pacific Northwest, available at
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forget civil liberties in times of insecurity. Unfortunately, the
immediate situation poses many of the same complex problems
that led to the adoption of the above security measures, which have
since been blemishes on our long record of commitment to
democracy and human rights. Because the terrorists walk among
law-abiding citizens in this country and have been able to exploit
our civil rights for their evil purposes, Americans' ability to protect
against additional attacks without somewhat restricting those rights
is impeded. The threat of future attacks creates a sense of urgency
that further increases the pressure on Congress to enact laws for
the immediate protection of citizens that may later be seen as
contrary to our belief in the principles of democracy and freedom.
The very nature of the current situation, however, provides
even more compelling reasons why Americans should not forsake
their constitutional freedoms. In the past, the United States has
engaged in wars to help free nations from government oppression
and human rights violations. Now we have been attacked by a
group of terrorists who seek to destroy that dedication to freedom
and human rights in our own country as well as in other parts of
the world. These terrorists will have achieved victory if we are
frightened into giving up some of our hard-earned freedoms that
they so vehemently despise. Columnist Jacob Sullum writes that
"[i]f [our government] rushes to adopt authoritarian measures...
'freedom itself could be added to the list of casualties."8 Rather
than helping terrorists achieve their goals, every safety measure
adopted to combat terrorism should be evaluated as to its
http://www.washington.edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/curcan/main.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8 Jacob Sullum, Slow Down, at
http://www.townhall.corn/columnists/jacobsullum/js20011002.shtml (Oct. 2,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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constitutionality. We should opt for measures that will promote
safety with the least effect on Americans' personal freedoms.
This Comment addresses the security measures that are
currently being used and those currently being considered for use
in our nation's airports. Sections I and II will discuss the
constitutional protections of passengers' civil liberties prominently
involved in this analysis. The analysis of whether each of these
technologies pass muster under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
of our Constitution is contained in Section III. Section IV outlines
a constitutional solution.
I. The Fourth Amendment -- Freedom from Unreasonable Search
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 9
While the text of the Fourth Amendment may not appear to
govern airport security measures on its face, federal courts have
interpreted it to apply to the pre-boarding searches of passengers
and their baggage in airports. In Katz v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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individual privacy against only unreasonable governmental
intrusion. In order to determine which intrusions constitute
"searches" and therefore are subject to the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has adopted the test
enunciated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in the Katz case.
This test includes a two-pronged analysis. First, the person being
searched must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.
Second, that expectation must be one that society accepts as a
reasonable one.11
Furthermore, a "search" has been held to encompass
examinations made by private airline employees who are not
government actors. In United States v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit
explained that generally, any search of a passenger or her baggage
conducted pursuant to a government-initiated search program will
implicate the Fourth Amendment even when performed by airport
personnel.' 2 The outer boundary of this principle is defined in
Gold v. United States, where the Ninth Circuit stated that an airport
search would cease to constitute governmental action subject to
Fourth Amendment protections when the search is "an independent
investigation by the carrier for its own purposes."' 3
However, because of the extraordinary nature of airport
searches and the limited time available in which to conduct them,
courts have commonly justified airport searches through analyses
10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that persons have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone and other wire communications,
and therefore searches of these communications are subject to Fourth
Amendment protections).
12 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973). -
13 Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1967).
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that avoid a warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. 14
In an opinion upholding the use of warrantless searches conducted
without probable cause during roadblocks, the Supreme Court
stated that "[w]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the [g]overnment's interests to determine whether it is
14 When dealing with searches in the airport security context, courts dealing with
the issue have used the following three rationales for dispensing with the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment:
1) Implied Consent - A person can consent to a search and by doing so
waives her Fourth Amendment protection that might otherwise require the
person performing the search to prove that probable cause existed to warrant the
particular search. Courts often refer to the implied consent doctrine in
upholding airport searches as constitutional when the persons searched had the
option to either resist the search and forgo the opportunity to enter the restricted
area, or to undergo the search and proceed in the boarding process. See United
States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973).
2) Administrative Search - This approach was carried over to searches
in the airport context by the court in United States v. Davis. This approach
allows security officers to search passengers without a warrant provided that the
following three requirements are met. First, the search must be "conducted as a
part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose"
(here, preventing weapons from being taken on planes). Second, the passenger
must have consented in that she voluntarily advanced through the security
checkpoint. Third, the search must meet the general Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement. Davis, 482 F.2d at 893.
3) Critical Zone - This test, found in the Moreno and Skipwith line of
cases, allows searches in airport boarding areas by analogizing these searches to
the warrantless searches permitted at the nation's borders on the theory that both
are "critical zones." United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
See infra note 15 and accompanying text for the "special needs" test that the
Supreme Court has stated in dicta would apply to remove the probable cause and
warrant requirements for airport searches.
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impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context., 15 Although the Supreme Court
has not yet specifically applied the special needs doctrine to airport
searches, in dicta it has repeatedly referred to airport security as the
ideal setting for the use of this doctrine.
16
Under all theories, however, courts continue to demand that
the searches permitted under these theories adhere to the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 17 The
Supreme Court has held that a search may satisfy the
reasonableness requirement if, after balancing the equities, the
government's need to conduct the search outweighs the intrusion
on the individual's rights and privacy., 8 Thus, the reasonableness
of airport searches must be determined by weighing the exigencies
of national security (including the level of individualized suspicion
aroused by the passenger) against the passenger's civil liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution.
II. The Fifth Amendment -- The Right to Travel
In Kent v. Dulles, Justice Douglas wrote the following on
behalf of the Supreme Court:
The right to travel is a part of the "liberty"
of which the citizen cannot be deprived
without the due process of law under the
15 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990) (quoting
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989)).16 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 608-13
(1989); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50.17 Supra note 14.
18 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
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Fifth Amendment.... [D]eeply engrained in
our history [is] this freedom of movement..
•. [a]cross frontiers in either direction, and
inside frontiers .... Freedom of movement
is basic in our scheme of values. 19
Air travel is not the only form of travel, and one could
argue that greatly restricting the personal liberties of airline
passengers does not deny them the freedom to travel. However,
while airline security is the main issue at hand, the standards set
for searching air passengers can and are likely to be extended to
passengers on boats, buses, trains, and subways, as these means of
transportation are also susceptible to terrorism. Thus, it must be
acknowledged that the technologies accepted for use in airport
security will affect a person's right to travel by dictating to what
level of intrusion a person must submit in order to exercise her
right to travel by any public means.2°
In balancing the competing interests of passenger privacy
and airport security, the Ninth Circuit in Davis stated that
"[a]lthough the right to travel is not absolute, and its scope and
limitations remain uncertain, it is firmly settled that freedom to
travel at home and abroad without unreasonable government
restriction is a fundamental constitutional right of every American
19 Jamie L. Rhee, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in
the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAuL LAW REV. 847, 860 (2000) (quoting
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958), overruled by Regan v. Wald, 468
U.S. 222 (1984)).
20 Many courts have considered whether the use of magnometers and baggage
scanners violate a person's right to travel but have concluded in the negative due
to the limited intrusion and high government interest. See, e.g., United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
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citizen."21 The government's interest in conducting the searches is
concededly stronger now that it is clear that all Americans, not just
those exercising the right to travel, are at risk. However, the above
passage implies that there might be some particularly intrusive
searches to which passengers should never be required to submit in
order to exercise this right to travel.
The Supreme Court has held that "even though the
governmental purpose [is] legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. 22
This mandates that the availability of other, more narrowly tailored
or less intrusive measures be considered in determining whether
the search of an airline passenger exercising her constitutional
right to travel is reasonable.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specified in United
States v. Skpwith that the reasonableness equation must also "take
into account the likelihood that the search procedure will be
effective in averting the potential harm."23 Thus, the crucial
question for this analysis is whether a search is a reasonable
invasion of passengers' privacy considering the perceived
governmental interest and the effectiveness and availability of
more narrowly tailored means.
21 Davis, 482 F.2d at 912.
22 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252 (1960).
23 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
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III. Analysis
A. Existing Technology - Magnometers and Baggage Scanners
Passengers in all airports currently have to walk through a
magnometer, commonly known as a metal detector, which will
sound an alarm if the person is carrying a certain amount of metal.
This enables security personnel to determine whether the passenger
is carrying a gun, knife or other weapon on her person. Baggage
scanners similarly allow the operator to see the outline and
consistency of objects packed inside the passenger's baggage to
ascertain whether the passenger is attempting to board with
weapons or explosives.
Courts nationwide have approved the use of these devices
to search all passengers seeking to enter airport boarding areas as a
reasonable search in light of the limited intrusion to the privacy of
passengers and the great need to prevent hijackings.24 However,
when baggage scanners and magnometers were integrated as a part
of routine airport security in the early 1970s, passengers scoffed at
the idea of having someone look into their bags and assess their
personal belongings.25 Where most airports had previously relied
primarily on profiling, the Federal Aviation Administration
required that by January 5, 1973, magnometers and baggage
24 See, e.g., United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972) (affirming the routine use of
magnometers and baggage scans for airport security).2 5 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.6 at 636-37 (3d ed. 1996) (in most airports prior to 1973, only
passengers selected by the profiling system were subjected to a magnometer
search).
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scanners be installed to search all passengers and their carry-on
luggage.26 These technologies were successful in reducing the
number of hijackings, and Americans ultimately came to see these
measures as not only reasonable but also essential. Indeed, even
before the September 1lth hijackings, few passengers would dare
to board a commercial airliner without walking through a metal
detector and seeing their carry-on luggage checked for fear of their
safety in the air being compromised.
B. BodySearch
BodySearch, manufactured by American Science and
Engineering (AS&E), gives security personnel virtual x-ray vision;
it allows the operator to see through the clothing of the passenger
by producing an image of the human form so sharp that "the shape
of a person's navel is visible, along with the shapes of other, more
private parts. ' 27 The machine has a panel that the passenger stands
against as the operator activates the machine, sending radiation that
penetrates a few millimeters below the skin to produce an image of
the passenger's nude body and any object that may be concealed
beneath her clothes.28 This image is produced by a low power x-
26 Davis, 482 F.2d at 902-03.
27 Lisa Lipmanl, U.S. Airport Searches Reveal More, Associated Press, Cnews,
available at http://www.baseball.ca/CNEWSFeatures0OO08/2 1bodysearch.html
(Aug. 21, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).28 Deepti Hajela, The Naked Truth, Associated Press, available at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/Sections/travel/DailyNews/scanner991230.html
(Dec. 30, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
FALL 20 011 AMERiCAS ANTI-HIJACKING CAMPAIGN
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
ray that uses the same backscatter technology used to scan carry-on
luggage. 29 Each machine costs approximately $140,000.30
A BodySearch scan would unquestionably be considered a
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment under the Katz
test.31 People wearing clothes do so because they have an
expectation of privacy in what lies beneath - an expectation that
society not only finds reasonable, but demands as a matter of
course. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently held that the use
of a thermal imaging device capable of gathering information
about the inside of a home that could not otherwise be obtained
without a physical search of the premises constitutes an
unreasonable search.32 It follows that the use of a similar device
allowing security to see portions of a person's body that cannot
otherwise be viewed without conducting a physical search, would
also be held to be a search for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
Privacy advocates oppose the use of this technology as a
pre-boarding search mandatory for all passengers. One such
group, Privacy International, a Washington-based organization,
found American Science and Engineering worthy of its annual
"Big Brother" award due to its marketing of this product.
However, most Americans are not likely to be offended by the
current use of these machines by the United States Customs
Service to detect contraband at international airports in Atlanta,
29 American International Group, Inc., Airport Report, available at
http://www.airportnet.org/depts/publications/amews/8-15-99.htm (Aug. 15,
1999) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).30 Lipanl, supra note 27.
31 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York.33
Proponents assert that the current use of BodySearch actually
enhances passengers' privacy because it allows those who have
aroused a minimum level of suspicion among customs officers a
less intrusive alternative to a frisk or strip search - one that does
not require the passenger to be touched or viewed openly by the
investigating agent.
34
In United States v. Skipwith, the court analogized that since
only "mere suspicion" is required to search a person's body at the
borders, this low level of suspicion should also apply to searches of
persons at the boarding areas of airports, as these places are also
critical zones.35 The Sk'pwith court also noted that, while the
scope of the search may encompass anything reasonably necessary
to assure the agent that the passenger has no weapons, "due
process demands that the imposition on the citizen be no greater
than the situation requires."36 Thus, the use of BodySearch as an
alternative for suspicious passengers transgressing American
borders is likely to be justified since courts have found its more
intrusive counterparts (traditional frisks and strip searches) to be
reasonably necessary in preventing weapons from being carried
aboard planes. 37
Even the use of BodySearch on domestic passengers who
arouse a minimal level of suspicion would likely be deemed
33 Gerry Volgenau, Smugglers Left Bare by New Customs'X-ray, DALLAS
MORNNG NEws, Apr. 9,2000, at 3G.
3 4 id.
35 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).36 Id. at 1277 (quoting dissent of Aldrich, J., id. at 1280).37 See generally United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Singh, No. 98-1265, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28999 (8th Cir.
Nov. 18, 1998) (per curiam).
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reasonable in light of both the national security crisis at hand and
the fact that these searches would be replacing either frisks or strip
searches, at the passenger's option. Also, the national security
interest in checking for nonmetallic weapons is now greater than
ever before due to the recent anthrax breakouts and threat of
biological warfare. Thus, the ability of BodySearch to detect
nonmetallic substances would make it a relatively quick and
accurate tool for law enforcement in conducting searches of
suspicious passengers.
Airports were reluctant to consider the widespread use of
this technology before September 1 lth, but Ralph Sheridan, CEO
of American Science and Engineering, "found himself speaking to
a newly receptive government audience in Washington" in the
days after the attack.38 Still, the use of this technology on all
passengers poses serious problems for American travelers, as it
would require every passenger to submit to a "virtual" strip search
absent any suspicion of wrongdoing whatsoever. No longer simply
an alternative, this would force the innocent majority of passengers
to subject their bodies to unnecessary radiation just to exercise the
right to travel. The United States Customs Service claims that the
radiation experienced from BodySearch is not harmful and has
indicated that "the radiation is less than what [one receives] in an
hour of daily life from natural background radiation." 39 However,
Robert Peters, vice president of sales and marketing for AS&E,
admits that "whether to exempt pregnant women and children from
38 Steven Levy, A High-Tech Home Front, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2001, at 43, 44.
39 Volgenau, supra note 33.
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exposure to the low level radiation" is a consideration before
BodySearch can be more widely used.n°
The Ninth Circuit wrote in Davis that "governmental
restrictions upon freedom to travel are to be weighed against the
necessity advanced to justify them, and a restriction that burdens
the right to travel 'too broadly and indiscriminately' cannot be
sustained. 4n If ever a search could meet these criteria and be
rejected in the face of a most urgent need, it would seem that a
search requiring every passenger to submit her body to observation
and radiation before being permitted to travel on a plane must
qualify. This supposition is enhanced by the fact that other, more
narrowly tailored means are available and could be highly
effective. Moreover, while the governmental interest in protecting
the public from hijackings may be extraordinarily great on
domestic (as compared to international) flights in light of recent
events, Americans' constitutional right to travel is assumed to be
susceptible to fewer restrictions in the case of domestic travel as
opposed to foreign travel.42 Therefore, it is not at all clear that the
use of BodySearch as part of the regular pre-flight screening-
process would pass the reasonableness requirement of searches
under the Fourth Amendment.
The intrusion of a BodySearch scan would be effective to
show the presence of contraband such as drugs and weapons.
However, this intrusion would seem unnecessary to disclose
40 Sheila R. Cherry, Are the Friendly Skies the Safest Skies?, available at
http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200101015.shtml (Jan. 1, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
41 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Apetheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964)).42 See United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1967);-Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958).
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hidden weapons, as magnometers that are carefully monitored are
already capable of alerting security to the presence of any
significant amount of metal. Thus, it follows that the addition of
BodySearch to mandatory airport security measures would
primarily serve to reveal drugs and other nonmetallic substances
that could not be otherwise identified. While the prevention of
drug trafficking should not justify the use of radiation to view
passengers' naked bodies, the possibility of discovering biological
agents may justify the increased use of this technology in some
instances.
Furthermore, security failures have been attributed not to
the malfunction or inadequacy of the magnometers, but to poor
monitoring of the machines. This is the true problem that, if not
corrected, would surely carry over into the monitoring of
BodySearch and limit any added effectiveness the machines could
offer. Security lapses due to improper monitoring are well
documented; in fact, many airlines had received fines from the
FAA in the months prior to the September 1 1th attacks for failure
to detect test objects at security checkpoints.43 Airport personnel
in charge of monitoring current security measures have been
accused of inadequacies ranging from simple inattentiveness to
poor hearing that limit their ability to hear the alarm sound among
the clatter of crowds of passengers. 44 Indeed, improved training of
4 3 MSNBC, Reagan National to Open Thursday, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/631075.asp (Oct. 2, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
44 Blake Morrison and Gary Stoller, Weapons Still Elude Airport Security
Monitors, available at http://www.usatoday.com/hphoto.htm (Oct. 2, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). One security
screener at Daytona Beach International Airport in Florida, age 72, complains
that at least 3 screeners are hard of hearing and frequently do not respond when
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
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security personnel is the more narrowly tailored means that could
produce the desired result without unnecessary intrusion into
passengers' desire to avoid overly intrusive searches.
It is highly probable that the September 1 lth hijackers
chose knives and box cutters because these items are far more
likely to escape security detection than other, more efficient
weapons such as guns or bombs. Even if detected, these items
were not very likely to arouse the suspicion of a hijacking. Thus,
the presence of BodySearch would not likely have prevented the
September 1 1th hijackings and may not prevent future attacks by
terrorists who are aware they will be subjected to BodySearch and
will have the opportunity to alter their behavior accordingly.
Instead, the consistent use of BodySearch on all passengers would
only make innocent travelers feel violated and ensure that terrorists
carry their weapons in carry-on luggage as opposed to on their
person.
In order for surveillance to be effective, it is vital that
airport security be increased in ways that foster legitimate
consumer confidence without causing potential passengers to turn
to alternative methods of travel. The long waits, the
embarrassment, and the demoralizing effect of treating innocent
Americans like common criminals would likely encourage
passengers to opt for other methods of transportation, thus
undermining the objective of getting Americans back on planes.
Because BodySearch is so intrusive, and because more effective
and more narrowly tailored means are available, it is doubtful that
the use of this technology pursuant to a government mandate
the alarm on the metal detectors is triggered. One 75-year-old screener has
glaucoma and is unable to see clearly objects that appear on the baggage
monitoring screen. Id.
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would meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
If, however, private airlines were to institute BodySearch
on their own initiative in order to increase safety in excess of that
provided pursuant to the government's standards, passengers may
view such use of the technology as an acceptable alternative to an
otherwise-objectionable governmental search. Such a scheme
would offer those that are willing to accept such intrusion based on
the belief that BodySearch will increase their chances of a safe
flight the option to choose airlines that employed the machines at
their own expense without limiting the rights of others. This
would likely survive judicial review insofar as it would be truly
independent and not merely a sham for the government to have
private companies do what they themselves cannot under the
Fourth Amendment.45
This technique would likely have far greater support among
passengers, because it would not carry the same negative stigma as
a search conducted by all airlines pursuant to a government
mandate. American consumers do not hesitate to shop in
department stores that employ video cameras in dressing rooms to
protect customers from the economic consequences of shoplifting.
Similarly, consumers who would choose an airline on the basis of
whether the airline did or did not use BodySearch would feel as if
they had exercised an economic option -- not that they had been
deprived of a civil liberty. While neither a department-store
camera nor BodySearch is capable of eradicating shoplifting or
hijacking by itself, if instituting BodySearch helps increase
consumer confidence, then we should not prevent airlines from
45 See Davis, 482 F.2d at 904.
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2protecting their revenues in much the same way that department
stores do.
C. Facial Structure Recognition
The biometrics industry has developed a security camera
that can scan ten to fifteen faces per second and match them
against a database of a selected category of people, such as
suspected terrorists whose profiles are already on file. 46 When the
system discovers a potential match of a captured image with a pre-
selected image in the database, security would be notified
immediately through an Internet alert.47 As with BodySearch, this
technology faced broad opposition before the September 1 lth
attacks but is now hailed with wide support.48 The United States
Department of Transportation has recently inquired about the
possibility of using a Visionics Corp. product named Faceft for
airport security. 49 The stock of companies manufacturing face-
scanning technologies has also skyrocketed since the attacks, and
the first facial recognition system was scheduled to be in place in
46 Bamaby J. Feder, Exploring Technology to Protect Passengers with
Fingerprint or Retina Scans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at B3. For a more
detailed look at this technology, see Kanya Bennett, Comment, Can Facial
Recognition Technology Be Used To Fight the New War Against Terrorism:
Examining the Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Surveillance Systems, 3
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 151 (2001), elsewhere in this issue.47 Robert O'Harrow Jr., Facial Recognition System Considered For US.
Airports, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2001, at A14.
4 8 d.
49id
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an unnamed American airport by early November 2001.50
However, several concerns need to be addressed before this
technology can be used effectively and in compliance with the
Fourth Amendment.
The debut of facial scanners into public security use within
the United States sparked bitter controversy between those in the
security industry and privacy advocates. Facial scanners
manufactured by Viisage were placed at the entrances to Raymond
James Stadium to scan the faces of unsuspecting football fans
attending the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida.51 The fans were
later outraged to find that their faces had been encoded by this
machine without their knowledge or permission. 52 Thomas
Colatosti, CEO of Viisage, defends his product by arguing that
facial scanning is not an invasion of privacy, since faces are not
private and can be captured on film any time someone appears in
public.53
I In this sense, facial scans might escape the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement altogether, as it is
doubtful that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
50 Reuters, Airport to Install Face-Scan System, available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/638161.asp?Osi (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
51 ACLU, Firm Defends "Snooper Bowl" Technology, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/w030901a.html (Mar. 9, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).52 Id. Thomas Colatosti, CEO of Viisage, the company who made the devices
used at the Super Bowl, braved a crowd of angry spectators trying to defend his
product as a useful security device and assured fans that any image that did not
match a criminal record was discarded. However, the product's controversial
foray into public security at the Super Bowl led to the arrest of only a few
scalpers and pick-pockets. Id.53 Id.
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the appearance of their faces under the plain view doctrine set forth
by the Supreme Court in Harris v. United States.54 This doctrine
provides that anything discovered by officers who have the right to
be in the position to view the object or activity is not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.55 The Court has
applied this doctrine to find that a search did not occur for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment simply because the view of the
officer was enhanced by various technologies.
56
However, it is not simply the unauthorized photographs
that have privacy advocates "all shook up" - it is the personal
information that will be attached to these images and the tracking
ability that the databases for these machines offer.57 The
traditional understanding of the freedom of movement to which all
Americans are entitled does not include the monitoring and
documentation of those movements. Citizens who are not
attempting to elude law enforcement expect to come and go when,
where, and with whom they want without government surveillance.
Thus, facial scans may be deemed searches under the Katz test
discussed earlier insofar as innocent Americans arguably have a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to their behavioral patterns.
Thus, the software databases created for facial recognition
systems should be closely regulated to prohibit the inclusion of
54 United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See also Kanya Bennett,
Comment, Can Facial Recognition Technology Be Used To Fight the New War
Against Terrorism: Examining the Constitutionality of Facial Recognition
Surveillance Systems, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 151 (2001).
55 Id.
56 See generally Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
57 John D. Woodward Jr., And Now, the Good Side ofFacial Profiling,
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at B4.
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profiles and personal data of innocent Americans.58 Civil
libertarians dismiss the argument that "if you have nothing to hide,
you have nothing to fear" by reminding us that this was the slogan
of the Stasi, the German secret police force responsible for
arguably the most hideous infingement on human rights in the
modem world.59 Our forefathers also recognized this possibility of
government abuse when they enacted the Fourth Amendment
reserving for all citizens, guilty and innocent, a minimum level of
protection against government invasions. John Woodward, a
senior policy analyst at Rand, points out that there could be other
concerns in that people who may have "paid their debt[s] to
society" might be subjected to intense scrutiny,6 ° which would be
most embarrassing and discouraging for someone who has truly
turned over a new leaf.
However, federal laws could be enacted to ensure that this
technology is not used improperly. If the databases used in facial
recognition systems were governed by strict federal legislation
requiring that all images not matched to a print of a certain class of
criminals and terrorists be promptly discarded, this technology
could actually promote privacy by providing security without great
intrusion to the individual. The profiles that may be selected for
inclusion in the database should be limited to only known and
suspected terrorists and possibly dangerous criminals, as opposed
to all citizens with criminal records. This would reintroduce the
probable cause element of the Fourth Amendment and assuage the
58 See Feder, supra note 46.
59 SchNews, Pubic Enemy No. One, available at
http://www.schnews.org.uk/archive/newsI 18.htm (May 2, 1997) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). This website also offers a
Picture of an image collected from a BodySearch scan.
Woodward, supra note 57.
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fears of those concerned with the maintenance of a large database
used to track individuals' movements.
In the meantime, however, the inaccuracy of this
technology presents another obstacle to the immediate use of this
technology in airports. Recall that the Skipwith court held that the
effectiveness of a search is a major consideration in determining
whether it will meet the reasonableness requirement.61 Visionics
markets its product Facelt as being superior to the downfalls of
human visual identification of a terrorist profile because it is
"resistant to changes in lighting, skin tone, eyeglasses, facial
expression and hair and is robust with respect to pose variations,
up to 35 degrees in all directions. 62 However, these capabilities
may be insufficient as a government study "showed a 43 percent
error rate of false negatives - a failure to properly identify posed
photographs of the same person taken 18 months apart. In other
words, persons who should have been caught were not. Put
another way: if Osama bin Laden were to stare in the camera at
one of our airports, the technology would have no more chance
than a coin toss of properly identifying him. 63
Thus, the limitations of this technology might present even
bigger problems when the photographs are not posed, because
while mugshots of American criminals are readily available,
suspected terrorists are unlikely to willingly pose for the camera.
61 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
62 See The Underlying Algorithm, Visionics Corp., available at
http://www.visionics.com/faceit/tech/Ifa.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).63 ACLU, Airport Security: Increased Safety Need Not Come at the Expense of
Civil Liberties, available at http://www.aclu.org/difficult days/facts-airport.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
FALL 2001]
This would make facial recognition technology primarily useful for
tracking only recently photographed domestic criminals, who may
be relatively harmless. In expending security resources and
manpower to monitor and maintain the scanners and their
databases, many unphotographed terrorists could remain
anonymous and be able to board planes with less scrutiny. The
effectiveness of this technology could increase over time, however,
as more photographs of each suspected terrorist could be added to
the database, thus increasing the probability of an accurate match.
Although the government interest in conducting these searches is
high and the intrusion is relatively slight if properly regulated, the
limited effectiveness and availability of other means may weigh
against facial scans being found reasonable until the accuracy of
the technology can be improved.
For the immediate future, more adept airport employees
would arguably be capable of providing better security at lower
costs to passengers' privacy and pocketbooks. Airport employees
are already available to man the security checkpoints. These
employees should be trained to recognize profiles and other
physical traits of suspected terrorists along with any noticeable
behavioral or personal characteristics. Accurate facial scanning
could, however, provide law enforcement with a distinct advantage
by supplementing human attempts to identify suspicious
passengers with an electronic analysis that cannot be fooled by a
different style of dress, makeup, or change in hair or eye color.
Until these improvements are made and the necessary laws
enacted, there are better alternatives to add to our security arsenal.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
D. Eye Scans
Many advocate using iris or retina scans as an alternative.
These methods of biometric identification are highly reliable since
the inside of an eye does not change with time. Retina scans
would identify passengers by the distinctive patterns of blood
vessels that mark each person's retina. 64 Iris scans rely on the
unique features of each person's iris, the colored part of the eye,
for identification. 65 Unlike facial recognition, this technology
cannot operate from afar. Passengers would be required to have
their eyes scanned well in advance of boarding in order for security
personnel to ascertain the identity of each passenger and whether
the scan matches that of a known terrorist. This scan would
unquestionably be a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, as one has the ultimate expectation of privacy as to
the intricate details of the inside of her body, in addition to the
reasonable expectation that an innocent passenger has as to her
movement patterns. The image obtained from the mandatory scan
would have to be encoded in some sort of "smart card," similar to a
domestic passport.
Paul Beverly, VP of smart cards at SchlumbergerSema,
reports that the smart card movement was already on the fast track
before the September 11th attacks. 66 Civil liberties groups
vehemently oppose the mandatory use of this technology for public
security. These groups fear that the use of eye scans would require
64 Feder, supra note 46.
6S Id.
66 Levy, supra note 38. Policymakers have toyed with the idea of implementing
a mandatory national ID card system for years which would be the ultimate use
of such smart cards; this debate, while important, is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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everyone to submit to an eye scan that could be used to track the
movements of innocent citizens and pave the way for a national ID
card - an idea already opposed on many privacy grounds.6 7 Barry
Steinhardt of the ACLU compares biometric security to the
techniques employed by "Big Brother" in George Orwell's 1984
and says, "We are now approaching a time when we will live in a
surveillance society where all our movements and actions will be
monitored. 68 Indeed, while a database maintained for the
purposes of facial recognition could be edited to include only
criminals' and terrorists' "face prints," the databases contemplated
for use with eye scans would include the identifying image and
personal data of all innocent people.69
Moreover, this database is seriously ineffective if it does
not include the scanned images of the eyes of terrorists - who are
unlikely to attend their mandatory eye scan appointments. Even if
eyes scans were done at birth, such a coordinated international
effort as would be necessary to be effective in prohibiting terrorists
from boarding our planes is unlikely. Thus, this measure would be
hard-pressed to pass the reasonableness test of the Fourth
Amendment, because this type of search does not provide safety
against the immediate terrorist threat nor any threat in the near
future due to the large number of years it would take to collect all
the identifying information and compile the massive database. The
extremely intrusive nature of this surveillance system when
compared to the non-intrusive alternatives currently available
weigh against the likelihood that this type of search can be held
constitutional.
67 See id. See also Laurent Belsie, Slide Toward Surveillance Society, THE
CMUSTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1.68 Belsie, supra note 67.
69 See Levy, supra note 38.
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IV. Solution
AS&E's Ralph Sheridan was correct when he said, "There
is no single perfect technology .... We have to throw up a
gantlet." 70 Instead of buying into a false sense of security and
allocating our resources in a way that diverts attention from the
true cause of the problem, it is necessary to identify measures that
we can take to produce an effective and constitutional solution.
Airport security legislation signed by President Bush on
November 19, 2001, does just that.71 The act mandates that all
airport screeners will become federal employees for the next three
years and will be subject to increased training and background
checks.72 These employees will also receive better salaries and
benefits to ensure that airport security positions attract competent
employees and have low turnover rates. 73 The act also requires
fortified cockpit doors and an increased presence of air marshals.74
These measures will be beneficial both to airport security and to
the protection of constitutional freedoms.
Significantly, the September 11th security failures have
been widely attributed to failures of human intelligence and
security personnel, not failure of our existing technologies. As
previously stated, even if the box cutters had been identified, they
70 Feder, supra note 46.
71 Major Garrett and Kelly Wallace, Bush Signs Aviation Security Bill, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/TRAVEL/NEWS/1 1/19/rec.bush.aviation.advance/in
dex.html (Nov. 19, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). See Aviation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597.
7 2 id.
73 Td.
74 Td.
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would have likely aroused little suspicion among security
personnel. This points to the conclusion that the technologies
presently used to search passengers are sufficient if operated in a
competent manner. Indeed, too much reliance on technology
diverts attention from the human components necessary for an
effective security program. Increasing the quality of security
personnel can adequately protect our safety while avoiding the
slippery slope of trading civil liberties for security. Americans fear
future hijackings right now, but once the immediate threat has been
eradicated, it is likely that society will no longer be willing to
accept such unreasonably intrusive security measures. At that
point, it will be too late to heed the admonitions of civil rights
advocates such as Benjamin Franklin, who once warned, "They
that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety. 75
75 Sullum, supra note 8.
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